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Why Do Hedgers Trade So Much?
Ing-Haw Cheng and Wei Xiong
ABSTRACT
Futures positions of commercial hedgers in wheat, corn, soybeans, and cotton fluctuate much
more than expected output. Hedgers’ short positions are positively correlated with price
changes. Together, these observations raise doubt about the common practice of categorically
classifying trading by hedgers as hedging while classifying trading by speculators as specu-
lation, as hedgers frequently change their futures positions over time for reasons unrelated
to output fluctuations, which is arguably a form of speculation.
1. INTRODUCTION
Financial innovations such as derivatives not only facilitate risk sharing
and price discovery, but critics argue that they also lead to reckless
speculation that amplifies price volatility and hinders efficient risk shar-
ing (Posner and Weyl 2013). This concern has led to a debate on the
regulation of financial innovation and trading of financial derivatives
and warrants a benefit-cost analysis of financial regulation. In this de-
bate, as well as in other broad contexts of analyzing risk sharing and
trading in financial markets, it is common to separate two groups of
traders—one group of traders with established commercial interests la-
beled hedgers and another group of financial traders labeled speculators.
Perhaps because of this distinction, the debate heavily focuses on
examining the behavior and impact of speculators, with little attention
on how hedgers trade in practice. Policy prescriptions often focus on
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the behavior of the speculator group while exempting the hedger group.1
Is this categorical treatment justified? Do hedgers trade just to hedge
risk in their commercial business? Or might there be other factors driving
their trading? In this paper, we systematically examine how hedgers trade
in the futures markets of a set of agricultural commodities: wheat, corn,
soybeans, and cotton.
Commodity futures markets offer a nice setting to examine the dis-
tinction between hedgers and speculators. Futures contracts on agricul-
tural commodities were early financial innovations that have a long
history of serving farmers and commodity producers to hedge the com-
modity price risk they face. The long-standing hedging pressure theory
of Keynes (1923) emphasizes the imbalance between the need of com-
modity producers to short sell commodity futures contracts and the lack
of interest from speculators to take the long side as a key determinant
of commodity futures prices. Through the financialization of commodity
futures markets in the last decade, commodity futures became a popular
asset class for portfolio investors and have attracted large inflows of
investment capital in the magnitude of hundreds of billions of dollars
to the long side. The large capital inflows have led to a heated debate
on the role of speculation in commodity futures markets, a debate par-
ticularly concerned with financial traders destabilizing commodity prices
(see Cheng and Xiong [forthcoming] for a review). While this debate
focuses on financial traders, more attention on how hedgers trade is also
warranted.
The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) publishes
data on the aggregate position levels in its Commitments of Traders
(COT) reports. By regulation, clearinghouses of commodity futures mar-
kets report the end-of-day positions of traders with positions larger than
certain reporting thresholds to the CFTC, which classifies each report-
able trader into several categories and reports aggregated weekly posi-
tions at the group level to the public. Individual traders are distinguished
by whether they have commercial interests in each commodity (CFTC
2013). For the bulk of our analysis, we focus on the behavior of pro-
ducer/merchant/processor/user positions reported in the CFTC’s Dis-
aggregated COT (DCOT) report and consider how these commercial
hedgers trade.
1. For example, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) has considered
position limits in futures markets, from which so-called bona fide hedgers may obtain ex-
emptions.
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Our analysis examines whether commercial hedgers’ trading patterns
are consistent with a simple benchmark notion of hedging in which risk-
averse commercial hedgers take short positions in futures to mitigate
their endowed commodity price and output risk. We proceed in two
steps.
First, we compare the intensity of hedgers’ trading with the uncer-
tainty in the aggregate output of each commodity. Intuitively, in the
absence of output uncertainty, a fixed hedging position equal to the size
of the output would perfectly hedge the price risk faced by hedgers. In
the presence of output uncertainty, Rolfo (1980) and Hirshleifer (1991)
develop theoretical models to show that hedgers tend to underhedge as
output is negatively correlated with price and that their hedging positions
fluctuate with expected output. Our empirical analysis shows that al-
though hedgers’ futures positions are much smaller than output, the
volatility of their positions is much higher than the output volatility
measured by either the year-to-year output fluctuation or month-to-
month fluctuation of professional output forecasts. Furthermore, al-
though output uncertainty declines over the harvest season, hedgers’
trading volatility remains stable throughout the year.
In the second step of our analysis, we examine what else might explain
the volatility of hedgers’ futures positions. We find that hedgers respond
strongly to changes in price. They short more futures contracts when
the futures price rises and reduce their short position as the futures price
falls.3 It is difficult to reconcile such trading behavior as purely that of
hedging strategies of risk-averse hedgers seeking to hedge price and out-
put uncertainty. For example, if prices rise in response to a demand
shock, all else equal, there is no change in the quantity of expected
output, yet our data suggest that hedgers’ short positions increase in
response to the increase in price.
Taken together, the high intensity of hedgers’ trading and the sensi-
tivity of their futures positions to prices are difficult to reconcile with
the view that hedgers predominantly trade to mitigate cash flow volatility
by reducing exposures. Our evidence suggests that, while the overall
short positions of hedgers in commodity futures markets do offset com-
modity price risk, hedgers frequently change their positions over time
for reasons unrelated to output fluctuations. Although more elaborate
3. In a related paper, Kang, Rouwenhorst, and Tang (2013) discuss how hedgers trade
frequently and in a contrarian fashion and find that they provide liquidity to speculators.
Our paper explicitly relates hedgers’ trading to output forecasts.
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models of hedging may explain a portion of this behavior (Rampini,
Sufi, and Viswanathan 2014), an interesting question for these models
is whether they can also simultaneously generate the significant trading
we observe in the data.
Overall, the distinction between hedgers and speculators based on
whether they have commercial interests or are financial traders is less
informative than previously thought for benefit-cost analyses of financial
regulation. Commercial hedgers appear to engage in both production as
well as complex trading activities traditionally viewed as the province
of financial firms with specialized trading operations. Both types of trad-
ers may be engaged in trades that contribute to price discovery or perhaps
to notions of reckless speculation. The key challenge lies in distinguishing
the motive behind trades.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some institu-
tional background and describes the data used in our analysis. Section
3 compares the volatility of hedgers’ position changes with the uncer-
tainty in aggregate commodity output. Section 4 examines the responses
of hedgers’ futures positions to price changes. We conclude in Section
5 with a discussion.
2. BACKGROUND AND DATA ON TRADERS’ POSITIONS
Centralized futures markets for agricultural commodities are some of
the earliest markets for derivatives in the United States, dating back to
the mid-1800s and the formation of the Chicago Board of Trade. The
futures markets for wheat, corn, soybeans, and cotton (the sample in
our analysis) continue to thrive, with total open interest averaging $79
billion in 2010.
Data on positions in these futures markets are collected and published
by the CFTC. Every day, traders’ positions in excess of a specified re-
porting threshold, which varies by commodity, are reported to the CFTC
by exchange clearing members, futures commission merchants, and for-
eign brokers. Positions are reported at the contract level (for example,
December 2001 corn). These data are aggregated by the CFTC into the
COT reports and have been published weekly on Tuesdays since 2000
and at a lower but regular frequency before then. Aggregate positions
in the COT account for 70–90 percent of open interest in any given
market.
The COT report categorizes positions into commercial and noncom-
mercial on the basis of trader classifications self-reported to the CFTC.
This content downloaded from 129.170.194.155 on Mon, 23 Feb 2015 09:43:42 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
W H Y D O H E D G E R S T R A D E S O M U C H ? / S187
Figure 1. Aggregate notional value of net positions for wheat, corn, soybeans, and cotton
Traders who exceed the reporting threshold are required to file CFTC
Form 40, which requires them to disclose information regarding the
nature of their business and whether they are using futures to hedge
business risk. On the basis of these forms and conversations with the
trader, the CFTC decides the appropriate classification. Since 2009, the
CFTC has published a DCOT report that separates positions into those
of producers/merchants/processors/users, swap dealers, managed money,
and other reportable traders. These data are available from 2006 by
using existing 2009 classifications retroactively applied to 2006 data.
The CFTC also published a Supplemental COT (SCOT) report that sep-
arates positions into those of commodity index investors, commercial
traders, and noncommercial traders. Broadly, commercial (COT, SCOT)
and producer/merchant/processor/user (DCOT) positions are meant to
include the positions of traders who trade futures to hedge their business
risk.4
Figure 1 plots the aggregated net (long minus short) notional position
value (computed using front-month contract prices, downloaded from
4. For a discussion of other classes of trader, see Cheng, Kirilenko, and Xiong (2013).
For a detailed discussion of the explanatory notes of the Disaggregated Commitment of
Traders (DCOT) report, see CFTC (2013).
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Bloomberg) for the different DCOT trader categories in the four sample
agricultural commodities.5 The figure shows that the net positions of
producers/merchants/processors/users consistently form the short side,
which suggests that producers’ net short positions are much larger than
users’ net long positions and dominate the positions reported for the
group as a whole. Swap dealers and managed money form the long side.
Gross positions (open interest) have grown significantly since 2000, as
have the net short positions of producers and net long positions of
financial traders such as index traders and hedge funds (Cheng, Kiri-
lenko, and Xiong 2013).
The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) keeps close track of crop
production in the United States and around the world. Between the 9th
and 12th of every month, it publishes the World Agricultural Supply
and Demand Estimates (WASDE) report, which tracks estimated pro-
duction, demand, and stocks for a large number of agricultural and
livestock products, including wheat, soybean, corn, and cotton. The
latter three are spring-planted crops, while wheat is planted in both the
winter and spring. Beginning in May, the USDA begins forecasting crop
production using trend yields and estimates of intended and planted
acreage.6 In June, the USDA surveys a large representative sample of
farms (in 1999, over 125,000) to gather information on planted acreage,
which informs subsequent production estimates. Estimates are revised
each following month on the basis of updated surveys about farmers’
expected yields through the beginning and end of fall harvest, after which
they are surveyed about actual yields until the end of April of the next
calendar year. Estimates from the WASDE reports thus represent both
the best real-time estimates of aggregate crop production in the United
States for a coming or in-progress harvest and the best historical esti-
mates of total crop production for previous harvests as well (see USDA
1999).
3. OUTPUT UNCERTAINTY AND HEDGING POSITION
A hedging strategy is often referred to as buying or selling of securities
intended to offset price fluctuations of existing positions. As a farmer
is naturally exposed to price fluctuations of crops in the field, a hedging
5. Front-month contract prices are available from the Bloomberg Professional service,
accessed through Bloomberg-provided terminals.
6. For wheat, estimates of winter wheat are posted in May, with spring wheat added in
July.
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strategy entails shorting commodity futures contracts to offset any price
drop at harvest time. If there is no output uncertainty, a fixed short
position in commodity futures with a size equal to the output would
perfectly hedge the price uncertainty faced by the farmer. In the presence
of output uncertainty, the optimal hedging strategy is more subtle. Rolfo
(1980) argues that output uncertainty leads producers to underhedge
because output is negatively correlated with price. Indeed, by studying
price and output uncertainty faced by cocoa producers in several coun-
tries, Rolfo shows that this insight helps explain the widely observed
underhedging by farmers. Hirshleifer (1991) derives a theoretical model
to systematically examine the optimal hedging strategy with both output
and price uncertainty. It is intuitive that the optimal hedging position
fluctuates with the expected output.
We first compare the volatility of positions with the uncertainty in
output. We measure output uncertainty in two ways, through the year-
to-year fluctuations in output and through the fluctuations in the
monthly output forecasts provided by the USDA in the WASDE reports.
The aggregate output of a commodity, say wheat, is determined by
the acres planted at the beginning of the season and the yield per acre.
As the planting area is determined by people, the output uncertainty
faced by farmers is mostly due to the yield. Figures 2–5 plot aggregate
output and yield from 1960 to 2012 for wheat, corn, soybeans, and
cotton. Indeed, the yield of each commodity is either the same or less
volatile than the aggregate output, which indicates that part of the an-
nual output fluctuation is due to changes in planting acreage.
Figures 6–9 plot the short positions of producers/merchants/proces-
sors/users from the DCOT as well as commercial positions from the
COT in commodity futures (in output-equivalent units) in each of these
four commodities together with the aggregate annual output.8 The fig-
ures suggest that both groups’ position changes are much more volatile
than the annual output changes. While the DCOT data consistently show
that producers/merchants/processors/users are net short, the COT data
show that commercials often have near-net-zero (sometimes even long)
positions, which highlights the comingling of swap dealers’ and pro-
8. To convert the output-equivalent futures position, we use the size of the contract
(5,000 bushels per contract for wheat, corn, and soybeans and 50,000 pounds per contract
for cotton) as well as the metric conversions reported at the end of each World Agricultural
Supply Demand Estimates (WASDE) report (.027216 bushels per metric ton for wheat and
soybeans and .025401 bushels per metric ton for corn; cotton output is reported in millions
of 480-pound bales).
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Figure 2. U.S. production and yields: wheat
Figure 3. U.S. production and yields: corn
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Figure 4. U.S. production and yields: soybeans
Figure 5. U.S. production and yields: cotton
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Figure 6. Commodity output and hedgers’ futures positions: wheat
Figure 7. Commodity output and hedgers’ futures positions: corn
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Figure 8. Commodity output and hedgers’ futures positions: soybeans
Figure 9. Commodity output and hedgers’ futures positions: cotton
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Table 1. Hedge Ratios, 2007–11
Mean SD SD/Mean
Wheat .28 .08 .29
Corn .17 .04 .27
Soybeans .32 .10 .32
Cotton .57 .19 .34
ducers’ positions that plagues the original COT report (Cheng, Kirilenko,
and Xiong 2013). For the rest of the analysis, we therefore rely on the
DCOT data from 2006 onward and refer to producers/merchants/pro-
cessors/users as producers given their consistently net short positions.
Table 1 shows means and standard deviations of these data in terms
of hedge ratios, defined as the short position of producers in commodity
futures divided by expected output. Consistent with Rolfo (1980), hedge
ratios are far less than 1, although this may be partially attributable to
comingling of users’ and producers’ positions. The average hedge ratio
is roughly 28 percent in wheat, 32 percent in soybeans, 17 percent in
corn, and 57 percent in cotton over this period. Notably, hedge ratios
fluctuated significantly over these years, as the standard deviations of
hedge ratios are roughly 30 percent of the mean for the four commod-
ities.9
Figure 10 formalizes this notion by displaying the volatility of annual
percentage changes in producers’ futures position, output, and yield for
each of the commodities over the 5 years from 2007 to 2011, from the
first year we can compute such changes using DCOT data through the
last year in which we have finalized ex post output.10 If producers were
maintaining fixed hedge ratios, these volatilities should be equal. How-
ever, the volatility of producers’ futures position ranges from .5 to .7
across the commodities, while the volatility of the actual yield changes
stays in a narrow range around .07.
Next we examine patterns of changes in monthly futures positions
and expected output by month of the harvest. Although the USDA begins
9. To compute average hedge ratios across harvests, we first average hedge ratios across
the 52 weeks of each year and then compute averages and standard deviations of these
averages over the harvests.
10. Annual changes in futures position were calculated by first computing the average
52-week percentage change in futures position across each week of a year and then com-
puting the volatility of this average across harvest years. Flipping the order of operations
and computing the 52 separate volatilities of 52-week futures changes (one for each week)
and then averaging these volatilities produces even more striking results.
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Figure 10. Volatility of annual percentage changes in hedgers’ futures positions, output, and yield
issuing forecasts in May based on trends, the harvest for spring crops
begins in August for wheat and cotton and September for corn and
soybeans.11 As discussed in Section 1, each month’s report contains more
information about aggregate supply for the year than the previous
month’s report. These forecasts tend to be very informative about the
coming year’s crops. Figure 11 plots the root-mean-squared error
(RMSE) of the forecast for 20 years by month from harvest, scaled by
the unconditional average of the actual harvest for each commodity. The
figure shows that the uncertainty declines monotonically as the forecasts
converge to the actual harvest. Even in the noisiest first forecast, the
average RMSE is between 6 and 13 percent of the harvest.
Figures 12–15 plot the volatility of percentage changes in producers’
futures position and the volatility of percentage changes in the monthly
forecast, again by month from harvest. Two salient observations are
common across commodities. First, the volatility of change in the pro-
ducers’ futures positions is several times larger than the volatility of the
changes in forecast. Second, the volatility of change in the producers’
futures positions is large throughout the year. This volatility appears to
11. Beginning-of-harvest dates can vary by region in the United States (USDA 2010),
but these months are the standardized months used by the USDA in its WASDE reports
to determine the so-called marketing year.
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Figure 11. Uncertainty in output forecasts
increase during the planting season (the 2 months furthest from the
harvest, just prior to the first issuance of forecasts for the next harvest,
represented by the right-most two points on the graphs), as uncertainty
presumably increases with the next planting. Nonetheless, it is high be-
fore then, even as output uncertainty is declining.
Figure 16 repeats these results using hedge ratios. Figure 16A shows
that the average hedge ratio across harvests is remarkably stable through-
out the harvest year. In contrast, Figure 16B shows that there can be
large percentage changes in hedge ratios from month to month, as the
volatility of these changes across harvests is quite high—between 10 and
50 percent.
In summary, producers’ futures positions in the four commodities are
several times more volatile than the output uncertainty. However, the
comingling of producers’ and users’ positions can pose difficulties for
interpreting the relative volatility of changes in positions and forecasts.
This leads to our next question: what cause hedgers to trade?
4. PRICE CHANGES AND HEDGING POSITION
We next focus on analyzing the correlation between changes in pro-
ducers’ futures positions and prices. Figures 17–20 plots the producers’
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Figure 12. Volatility of hedgers’ positions and output forecasts, 2006–11: wheat
Figure 13. Volatility of hedgers’ positions and output forecasts, 2006–11: corn
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Figure 14. Volatility of hedgers’ positions and output forecasts, 2006–11: soybeans
Figure 15. Volatility of hedgers’ positions and output forecasts, 2006–11: cotton
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Figure 16. Hedge ratios
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Figure 17. Hedgers’ position and commodity futures prices: wheat
Figure 18. Hedgers’ position and commodity futures prices: corn
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Figure 19. Hedgers’ position and commodity futures prices: soybeans
Figure 20. Hedgers’ position and commodity futures prices: cotton
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short position in each of the four commodity futures together with the
futures price from January 2006 to December 2012. There is a salient
pattern—producers’ short positions move in sync with the price. That
is, as the price rises, producers increase their short position, while as
the price falls, they reduce their short position. Indeed, in contrast to
the annual volatility of changes in output, the volatility of changes in
price is on the same order of magnitude as the volatility of changes in
position, as shown in Figures 2–5.
Table 2 provides results from a regression of monthly percentage
changes in producers’ short positions on the 12-month and 1-month
percentage changes in output forecasts and the percentage change in
monthly futures price. We include a turn-of-harvest effect to control for
how output forecasts roll over to the next harvest in May and fully
interact this effect with the main effects of interest. We use the Newey
and West (1987) construction of the covariance matrix in computing
our standard errors to allow for serial correlation. Coefficients are re-
ported as standard deviations of percentage changes in positions per 1
standard deviation of the right-hand-side variable.
From Table 2, we observe that, first, there is little consistent corre-
lation between the monthly change of producers’ short positions and
the 12-month or 1-month change in forecasted output. Second, the
monthly change in position is positively and significantly correlated with
the monthly change in futures price across all commodities. Third, the
bulk of the variation in change in position is explained by changes in
price, as adding the price change term to the forecast output terms
increases the R2-value for each commodity significantly (ninefold for
wheat, threefold for corn, 20-fold for soybeans, and 10-fold for cotton).
Can we explain the positive correlation between producers’ change
in short positions and price changes on the basis of a pure hedging
strategy? It is difficult to reconcile such trading behavior purely on the
basis of hedging strategies of risk-averse producers seeking to hedge price
and output uncertainty. To fix intuition, consider a representative pro-
ducer who faces uncertainty in both price and output. Consider an in-
crease in the price, which may arise because of a negative aggregate
supply shock or positive aggregate demand shock. In the former case,
all else equal, less output needs to be hedged, yet our data suggest that
hedgers increase their short positions in response to a higher price. In
the latter case, all else equal, there is no change in the quantity of
expected output, yet our data suggest that producers’ short positions
increase with the price increase.
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Certain aspects of different hedging models may explain away a por-
tion of this behavior. Negative aggregate supply shocks may put pro-
ducers closer to financial distress (despite higher prices) so that they need
to actively increase their hedge ratio more than that implied by the
natural passive increase following the negative quantity shock, as might
be suggested by models of hedging such as Smith and Stulz (1985) and
Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993). Whether this explains the average
relationship between price and hedging could be tested in principle by
examining whether the price reaction of trading is related to the supply
or demand component of price movements through a careful instru-
mental variables analysis. Notably, however, Rampini, Sufi, and Vis-
wanathan (2014) provide evidence that airline fuel hedging decreases,
rather than increases, with financial distress, as hedging requires costly
collateral.
This costly collateral mechanism may induce a positive correlation
between changes in position and prices. For example, producers may
increase hedges in response to positive demand shocks that raise the
price and thus their net worth. An interesting question for these models
is whether they can simultaneously generate the high degree of trading
that we observe.
5. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
Overall, it is problematic to categorically classify trading by hedgers as
hedging and trading by speculators as speculation. Although hedgers
tend to take short positions that hedge risk in their commercial business,
on the margin, they engage in significant non-output-related trading.
One possibility is that hedgers take a view on prices just as speculators
do. As noted in Stulz (1996), commercial hedgers may attempt to exploit
informational advantages by trading against speculators. For example,
agricultural firms may have better knowledge of local physical market
conditions across the country, as the opacity of physical markets may
induce significant informational frictions. However, it is well known that
information asymmetry alone prevents, rather than leads to, trading, as
in the no-trade theorem of Milgrom and Stockey (1982). Odean (1998)
and Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) show that overconfidence or a belief
by each trader in an informational advantage over others helps generate
excessive trading between groups of traders. In other words, heteroge-
neous beliefs induced by overconfidence in an informational advantage
leads to excessive trading. Consistent with this notion of speculative
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trading, another possibility is that by hedging away some of their risk,
hedgers are able to speculate more heavily on the basis of their dis-
agreements against speculators regarding future price movements, as in
Simsek (2013).12 Finally, participants in futures markets are not pro-
ducers themselves but are market makers who trade in futures markets
to hedge forward contracts written with ultimate commodity producers
such as farmers, although our analysis implies that these producers are
themselves speculating on the price.
Any of the above possibilities raise complex questions, as market
making, speculation based on heterogeneous beliefs, and active trading
based on informational advantages are at odds with the canonical notion
of hedging behavior. Anecdotal evidence suggests that commercial hedg-
ers speculate on prices using their position both in spot and futures
markets. Pleven (2012) relates stories of farmers speculating on rising
corn prices using a combination of storage and options contracts. Ag-
ricultural firms such as Cargill exploit complex trading strategies that
profit from the spread between futures and spot prices and may tilt their
exposure on the basis of information about coming shortages or over-
supply in certain areas (Davis 2009). Archer-Daniels-Midland Company,
a large grain processor, notes in its 2012 annual report that it “uses
exchange-traded futures and exchange-traded and over-the-counter op-
tions contracts as components of merchandising strategies designed to
enhance margins” (Archer-Daniels-Midland Company 2012, p. 45). Al-
though at odds with the canonical notion of hedging behavior, such
trading may contribute to price discovery if it is based on genuine in-
formational advantages or may lead to excessive price volatility if it is
induced by overconfidence. Further research on this issue is required.
Our analysis offers implications for benefit-cost analysis of financial
regulation in two ways. First, from a conceptual point of view, our
findings suggest the need to expand the scope of the benefit-cost analysis
from the usual emphasis on costs brought by reckless speculation of
financial speculators to cover potential reckless speculation by market
participants, including hedgers with established commercial interests.
Second, our findings caution against overweighting the identity of the
trader as a factor in classifying trades and instead emphasize the motive
of the trade, which may be difficult to ascertain. This caution echoes
12. The presence of heterogeneous beliefs raises challenges to welfare analysis of futures
market trading. See Brunnermeier, Simsek, and Xiong (2012) and Gilboa, Samuelson, and
Schmeidler (2012) for recently proposed welfare criteria to analyze welfare in economic
models with heterogeneous beliefs.
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the concern raised by Cochrane (2013) and Duffie (2013) that policy
distinctions based on trading motives may be more challenging than ever
to construct.
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